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Definition of the Middle East
No consensus has been reached on a definition of the Middle East. Some
•writers refer to this area as the Near East; others refer to it as the Middle
East. The term Middle East seems to be of recent origin and owes its popular
acceptance in modern times to Britain.
In this investigation the term Middle East will be used with the under¬
standing that it embraces
...the Arab League states (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Le¬
banon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen), Cyprus, Iran, Israel,
the principalities along the southern and eastern fringes
of the Arabian Peninsula, (the crown colony and pro¬
tectorate of Aden, Muscat and Oman. Trucial Oman, Qatar,
the Bahrayn Archipelaga and Kuwait), the Sudan and
Turkey.1
The Middle East has had an explosive history for centuries. Perhaps the
most serious conflicts encountered by the Middle East are those which resulted
in the crises of 1956. Among those crises were the struggle for Arab
nationalism, the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the West, Israel's attempt
to survive, Russia's support of the anti-colonialists of Africa and Asia,
and the attempts of the United States to counteract the influence of Russia
in the Middle East.
J. C. Hurewitz, "Unity and Disunity
Concilation, CCCCLXXXI (May, 1952), 201.




The purpose of this investigation is to present a critical analysis of
the recent Suez Canal crisis.
Significance of the Problem
The significance of the Middle East is threefold: strategic, economic
and political.
The strategic significance of the Middle East has been its chief
importance in world affairs since "the expansion of Europe" turned the whole
world into a theater of power politics. Even the Crusaders realized the
value of the Middle East as a land bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Control of the area by a potent sea power limits the scope of a military
conqueror.2
President Truman stated this point of view in 1946. "The...Middle East
comprises an area which presents grave problems. This area...lies across the
most convenient routes of land, air and water communication between the west
and the east. It is consequently an area of great strategic importance."3
...the main reason for its strategic importance has
shifted from geographic location to oil.... Oil has
been one of the chief agencies in the annihilation of
the advantages of geographic position everywhere. Yet
since oil is at the same time a basic source of energy
in a technological age, the countries possessing it are
of major strategic significance.1*'
2Don Peretz, "Peril in the Middle East," United Nations World. V (March,
1951), 29.
^"Army Day Address," cited in William Reitzel and others, United States
Foreign Policy, 1943-1955 (Washington, D. C., 1956), p. 210.
Ssilen Deborah Ellis, "Tension in the Middle East," Current History, XX
(June, 1951), 333-
3
The economies of the Middle Eastern states are pastoral, with the
possible exception of Israel. They are in general competing and not comple¬
mentary, for most countries tend to produce the same types of agricultural
product. The principal obstacles to the economic integration of the Middle
East are the low living standards and the limited interchange of goods among
the masses of the population.5
This area, poor in most natural resources, is rich in oil. The oil
wells in the Middle East produce 16 per cent of the world's known oil
reserves.^ From these wells come most of the oil that turns the wheels of
Western Europe's industries, and the oil that keeps in operation the tanks
and planes and battleships that make up Western Europe's military establish-
7
ments.'
The oil producing areas are in the Arab lands of Iraq and Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait. Egypt has oil, but not enough to meet its own needs. Oil has
O
not been found so far in Lebanon, Jordan or Israel.
The political and economic importance of the Middle East is somewhat
related.
...the oil resources of the Middle East are regarded as
belonging to the sovereign authority of the state. Since
these countries are undeveloped, the practice was established
of granting concessions to foreign companies which possessed
^"Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East," United Nations,
cited in J. C. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 203.
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"Dangerous Middle East, What and Where It Is," United States News and
World Report, December 14, 1956, p. 36.
4
the finances, technical skills, and organization for
the large-scale production, refining and distribution
of oil. The companies concerned are Britain, France,
Holland and the United States.°
Foreign competition for the operation and control of the oil fields
since 1900 has progressively injected a new tension into the Middle East.10
...foreign operation of the oil...has meant that
a large proportion of the wealth of these countries
has gone into the hands of outsiders - individuals
or foreign governments. If kept within the country
these funds could be used for the economic advance¬
ment of the inhabitants.11
1 p
An awakening of these conflicts has fanned the flames of nationalism.
"The Middle East may be considered the balance of power in Western
Europe. It can function as a barricade against Soviet penetration of the
African continent or it can serve as a thoroughfare for such penetration.
The security of Western Europe depends upon the Middle East."1^ The princi¬
pal adversary of the Soviet Union is the Western Alliance and its weakening is
the Soviet Union's main objective. If the Middle East is kept in a state of
W.
Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 213.
10Ellis, op. cit., p. 333.
11Ellis, op. cit., p. 334.
"^Ellis, op. cit., p. 334.
13
C. Grove Haines, "The Middle East in World Affairs,"





tension and unrest it can enable the Soviet Union to achieve this goal.
A Sovietized Middle East would enable the Kremlin to
possess its long sought Mediterranean outlet. If
this objective is achieved, North Africa would be
open to Communist penetration.-*-5
Because of these three factors, the Middle East is playing a major
role in changing the trends in the struggle for world power.
^Ibid.
■^Alfred M. Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East (New York, 1957)>
p. 18
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SUEZ DISPUTE
For 82 years the Suez Canal...has been the short sea
route from Europe to the East, linking the Mediter¬
ranean, to the Red Sea. The Suez Canal was built by
deLesseps in 1876 when Khedieve Mohammed Said, was
viceroy of Egypt.1
By the act of concession of 1876, the Khedieve
Mohammed Said, authorized deLesseps, a Frenchman,
to form a company to construct, maintain and
operate the Suez Canal....^ This company was given
a 99 year lease dating from the opening of the
canal. At the end of this period, the canal was
to become the property of the Egyptian government.3
In 1875* Prime Minister Disraeli of England purchased 177*000 of the
Canal Company's 400,000 shares of stock from Egypt's financially embarrassed,
spendthrift Khedieve.^ With this purchase of 44 per cent of the Suez Company
shares, Britain won effective control of the canal.^
The Convention of 1888
In 1888, the vital Constantinople Convention was signed, and later
ratified by the governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria,
^"The Suez Canal," Life, October 22, 1951* P- 76.
p
Sir John A. Marriot, The Eastern Question (4th ed. Oxford, 1940), cited
in "The Suez Canal, Nationalization, Invasion, International Action,"
International Review Service, III (February, 1957)* 1.
3lbid.
4 ^
Life, op. cit., p. 7°-
^Henri Paydenot, LeCanal de Suez (Paris, 1955)* cited in International
Review Service, op. cit., p. 2.
6
7
Hungary, Italy, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the Netherlands.^ The first
article reads:
The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and
open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every
vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of
flag. Consequently the High contracting parties agree
not in any way to interfere with the free use of the
canal, in time of war as in time of peace. The canal
never shall be subjected to the exercise of the right
of blockade.^
One could not foresee at that time what dynamic political changes
would occur in the course of the next sixty-seven years.
Agreement by the West to Maintain Peace
in the Middle East, 1950
On May 25, 1950, Britain, France and the United States agreed to main¬
tain peace in the Middle East. Under the tripartite pact these three
governments agreed to render military aid to the Arabs or the Jews if either
should be attacked by the other. The first article reads:
The three Governments recognize that the Arab states
and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of
armed forces for the purposes of assuring their
legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play
their part in the defense of the area as a whole.
All applications for arms or war material for these
countries will be considered in the light of these
principles.”
^William F. Longgood, Suez Story, Key to Middle East (New York, 1957);
p. 82.
•7
Hugh J. Sconfield, The Suez Canal in World Affairs (New York, 1953);
P- 52.
O
°Carol A. Fisher and Fred Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis (New York,
1959); P- 126.
8
Nasser's Ascendancy to Power, 1954
In 1954, Nasser became premier of Egypt. His predecessor was
President Nagib who relinquished his post on February 23, 1954.^
Withdrawal of British Troops, 1954
From the beginning of his reign, Nasser was a man of action. On
October 19, 1954, the British and Colonel Nasser signed an agreement pro¬
viding for the complete evacuation of British forces from the Suez Canal base
by June l8, 1956.10
Under the terms of the settlement between Egypt and Great Britain,
most of the canal base would be turned over to the Egyptians but if there
were an attack by any outside power (other than Israel or an Arab League
state or Turkey within a seven year period,) the British could return and
occupy the base for their own use.'1'1 Within the next two years Britain
closed down most of the Suez Canal base.
United States and Great Britain Agree to give
Nasser a Loan to Build the Aswan Dam
In 1955} Nasser appealed to the United States and Great Britain for a
loan. The purpose of this loan was to help construct the Aswan Dam. The
United States and Britain offered Egypt a total of $70,000,000 (the United
^"The Middle East Today,". Foreign Policy Bulletin, March 15, 1954,
p. 8.
^Longgood, op. cit., p. 120.
11
Longgood, op. cit., p. 121.
9
States $56,000,000 and Britain $14,000,000) toward the cost of building the
12
Aswan Dam.
Egyptian Procurement of Arms from
the Soviet Bloc, 1955
Prior to this agreement Nasser announced that he had negotiated a
treaty to buy a large quantity of Czechoslovakian arms (including jet aircraft)
in exchange for Egyptian cotton.^ The West, fearing Nasser would get Soviet
aid in financing the dam and thus virtually make Egypt a satellite, offered
lk
to build the dam. After the West had promised Nasser the loan he was in
no hurry to accept. He stated that Russia had made him a better offer.^
In a rider to the 1956 Foreign Aid Bill, the Senate Appropriations
Committee barred use of funds for the Egyptian Aswan Dara.^ It was decided
that Egypt's economy was unsound, and that it was not feasible in present
circumstances to participate in the project."*^ On July 29, 1956, the United
States and Britain replied with a refusal. Two days later, Russia announced
-j O
that it too had no intention of offering aid to finance the dam.
12
International Review Service, op. cit., p. 5•
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On July 27, 1956, Nasser made a speech in Egypt.
...he declared that the West's offer of financial
assistance was accompanied by impossible conditions,
involving the independence of Egypt.^
Summing up this part of this speech, the President declared:
The reason why America and Britain denied the loan
is not our economic position, but the fact that
we have decided to equip our Army and follow an
independent policy. We don't want our freedom
to be tied by any nation.20
Nasser Nationalizes the Canal, 1956
On July 30, 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. He placed the
canal in the hands of a special board attached to the Egyptian Ministry of
Commerce. President Nasser, on nationalizing the canal, said that "Thirt-
five million Egyptian pounds have been taken away from us every year by the
Suez Canal Company. We shall use that money for the building of the Aswan
The crisis began moving toward a head when the Suez
Canal Company authorized its pilots and their
employees to leave Egypt. The majority left, in¬
cluding l4l foreign pilots who said they couldn't
work with a gun at their backs...traffic was kept
moving...British, French, and most European ships
continued to pay tolls to the Suez Canal Company's
London and Paris accounts which Egypt reluctantly
accepted.^
P-
■^Cited in Fisher and Krinsky, op. cit., p. 5-
20Cited in Michael Adams, Suez and After Year of Crisis (Boston, 1958),
21
Cited in Longgood, op. cit., p. 146.
22 ,
Longgood, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
11
The Suez Canal is the major asset to an economically unsound Egypt.
Nasser capitalized on this asset by nationalizing the canal and promising
complete compensation to shareholders. France and Britain refused to pay
tolls to the new Suez Canal Company. Instead, these two countries paid
tolls to the Suez Canal Company in London and in Paris.
In 195^, a five hundred-ton Israeli freighter approached the southern
entrance of the Suez Canal. The ship was manned by ten Israelis, and
carried a cargo of ninety-three tons of meat, forty-two tons of plywood,
and thirty tons of hide. The Egyptians seized the ship, confiscated the
cargo and imprisoned the crew. This incident was not made a major issue




Longgood, op. cit., p. 115•
CHAPTER III
DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENTS FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE
Britain and France contended that the nationalization of the Suez
Canal was a breach of the 1888 Convention guaranteeing freedom of passage
through the canal and of Egypt's commitments under the Canal Company1s
concession. Even more important to Western Europe was the fact that some
sixty-seven million tons of oil a year needed to pass in the tankers
through a canal which was now under the control of a military dictator
antagonistic to the West and apparently friendly to the Soviet bloc.'*'
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in London on July 31,
1956, and persuaded Britain and France to call a conference of the signatories
of the 1888 Convention and other maritime powers.^
On August 3, 1956, England issued invitations to Australia, Ceylon,
Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugual, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
Russia and the United States.3
The purpose of this meeting was to negotiate the differences between
[l
the Anglo-French demands for international control of the Suez Canal.
"'“Sir Reader Bullard, The Middle East, A Political and Economic Survey
(New York, 1958), p. 204.
2Ibid., p. 205.






Greece and Egypt refused to attend this conference. Egypt stated
that ''the London Conference has no right to discuss Egyptian affairs.
g"Therefore the invitation to such a conference cannot be accepted by Egypt."
Egypt proposed the establishment of a special international negotiating
body representing the users of the canal to review the Constantinople Con¬
vention of 1888 and to guarantee freedom of navigation through thecal.7
This was rejected by the West. Nasser had already violated the same covenant
by barring Israeli shipping from the canal. Tne West did not have the
O
assurance that the waterway would be properly maintained and improved.
The First Conference, 1956
In mid-August the eighteen powers met in London. On August 20, 1956,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles introduced a proposal, which was
amended by Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. On August 23, 1956, the
9
eighteen powers accepted the proposal.
The proposal reads:
Assumming for the purposes of this statement that just
and fair compensation will be paid to the Universal
Company of the Suez Maritime canal, and that the
necessary arrangements for such compensations including
provisions for arbitration in the event of disagreement
^Michael Adams, Suez and After Year of Crisis (Boston, 1958), P* 20.
^"The Suez Canal, Nationalization, Invasion, International Action,"
International Review Service, III (February, 1957), 8.
7Ibid.
^William F. Longgood, Suez Story, Key to Middle East (New York, 1957),
p. 150.
^"Conclusion of the First London Conference," Department of State
Bulletin, XXXV (September 3, 1956), 373*
will be covered by the final settlement contemplated
below:
l) They affirm that as stated in the Preamble of the
convention of 1888, there should be established a
definite system destined to guarantee at all times
and for all the powers, the free use of the Suez
Maritime Canal. (2) Such a system, which would be
established with due regard to the sovereign rights
of Egypt, should assure (a) Efficient and dependable
operation, maintenance and development of the canal
as a free, open and secure international waterway
in accordance with the principles of the convention
of 1888. (b) Insulation of the operation of the
canal from the influence of politics of any nation.
(c) Respect for the sovereignty of Egypt, (d) a
return to Egypt for the use of the canal which will
be fair and equitable and increasing with enlarge¬
ments of its capacity and greater use. (e) Pay¬
ment to the Universal Suez Canal Company of such
sums as may be found its due by way of fair com¬
pensation. (f) Canal tolls as low as is consistent
with the foregoing requirements. (3) to achieve
these results on a permanent and reliable basis there
should be established by a convention to be negotiated
with Egypt. The members of the Board in addition to
Egypt would be other states chosen in a manner to be
agreed upon from among the states parties to the
convention with due regard to use pattern of trade
and geographical distribution. The Board would
make periodic reports to the United Nations. 0
The Soviet Union, India, Ceylon, and Indonesia supported another plan.
This plan designated an international advisory board for the purpose of
consultation. The operation of the canal was to remain in the hands of Egypt.
This plan was rejected.^
The Conference decided to send a mission composed of representatives
of Australia, the United States, Ethiopia, Persia and Sweden, under the
10Department of State Bulletin, op. cit., p. 373.
■'--'-Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 16.
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leadership of R. G. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, to present
12
the majority plan to Egypt.
The mission was given no latitude for negotiation. Nasser responded
by saying:
We have studied most carefully all the proposals
submitted.. .with regard to this problem. We find
ourselves in agreement with the eighteen countries
when they state that the solution must respect
sovereign rights of Egypt; Safeguard the freedom
of passage through the Suez Canal; Respect the
efficient and dependable operation, maintenance
and development of the Canal. When, however, we
consider the ways and means proposed by the
committee to attain these objectives we find that
they are self-defeating and that they lead to
opposite results from those aimed at.^-3
For France and Britain the failure of the Menzies mission signified the
ending of the attempt to gain their objective by diplomacy, and cleared the
lk
way for a solution by force.
The Second Conference, 1956
To calm Britain and France, Dulles tried another idea at the second
London Conference. Dulles introduced the Canal User's Plan. This plan
suggested an organization of ship owners rather than states which could
put pressure on Nasser and at the same time make itself independent of him
■^Bullard, op. cit., p. 205-
^Department of State Bulletin, op. cit.. p. 374.
1
R. C. Mowat, Middle East Perspective (New York, 1959)> P- 253.
16
by imposing a boycott on using the canal.^
The declaration providing for the establishment of a Suez Canal User's
Association reads:
The members of the Suez Canal User's Association
shall be those nations which have participated in
the second London Conference and which subscribe
to the present declaration and any other adhering
nations which conform to criteria to be laid down
hereafter by the association. The Suez Canal
User's Association shall have the following pur¬
poses (l) To facilitate any steps which may lead
to a final provisional solution of the Suez
Canal problem and to assist the members in the
exercise of their rights as users of the Suez
Canal in consonance with due regard for the rights
of Egypt. (2) to promote safe, orderly, efficient
and economical transit of the canal by vessels of
any member nation desiring to avail themselves of
the facilities of the Suez Canal User's Associa¬
tion and to seek the cooperation of the competent
Egyptian authorities for this purpose. (3) To
extend facilities to vessels of non-member
nations which desire to use them. (4) To receive,
hold and disburse the revenues accruing from any
user of the canal may pay the Suez Canal User's
Association without prejudice to existing rights
pending a final settlement. (5) To consider and
report to members regarding any significant de¬
velopments affecting the use or non-use of the
canal. (6) To assist in dealing with any practical
problems arising from the failure of the Suez
Canal adequately to secure its customary and in¬
tended purposes and to study forthwith means that
may render it feasible to reduce dependence on
the canal, (j) To facilitate the execution of
any provisional solution of the Suez problem
that may be adopted by the United Nations.!^
It was decided that the organization for the User's Association would
be set up at the third Conference.
15Ibid., p. 254.
*| ^
"The Second London Conference," Department of State Bulletin, XXXV
(October 1, 1956), 508.
17
The Third Conference, 1956
The third Conference met October 1, 1956- The United States and her
allies could not agree on how the User's Plan should operate. Finally
the matter was submitted to the Security Council of the United Nations
17
where an agreement was reached on six basic principles. '
"They affirmed Egyptian sovereignty and the need for free and open
transit through the canal. They stated that the operation of the canal
1 ft
should be insulated from the politics of any country." More important,
the matter of fixing the tolls was to be decided by agreement between Egypt
and the users, and a fair proportion allotted for development. "If there
were disagreements on this, or about the compensation due the Company,
19
settlement should be made by arbitration."
Nasser accepted the terms in principle and it appeared that an
agreement would be reached when rumblings were heard of intensive military
activity in Israel.^
^Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East, A History (New York, 1959); p. 6
^•^Mowat, op. cit., p. 255.
19
Mowat, op. cit., p. 255.
20
Longgood, op. cit., p. 151.
CHAPTER IV
THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN WAR
The Causes of the War
To portions of the Western World, the Israeli invasion came as a
surprise. Prior to the Israeli invasion several events occurred. There
seems to he a general consensus among most authorities that these dis¬
turbing events led to the Israeli invasion. Enumerated below are the
events in the order of their occurrence.
By a resolution of the United Nations, the state of Israel came
into existence on May lh, 19^8. On that day she was attacked by the
armies of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Hostilities were con¬
cluded by a series of armistice agreements that were signed at various
dates in 19^-9 with each of the Arab states, except Iraq. The preamble to
each of these armistice agreements stated that their purpose was "to
facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in
Palestine." During the seven years that followed, no peace treaties
between Israel and any of the Arab states were negotiated. The Arab states
refused to recognize Israel's existence.
p
Egypt established a blockade against all Israeli ships. The blockade
was extended to the Gulf of Aqaba and all trade to and from Israel's port
''"Robert Henriques, 100 Hours to Suez (New York, 1957)? P* 22.
p
"Steps that Led to the War," United States News and World Report,
November 9? 1956, p. 33•
18
19
of Elath at the head of the Gulf was completely stopped. This measure
3
could only he justified on the grounds that Egypt was at war with Israel.
To augment the blockade of Israel's shipping, the Arab League states
organized an economic boycott. It allowed no trade or communication of
any sort between its members and Israel. Its members refused to trade with
4
Israel. Nasser, after seizing power in 1953? moved against Israel with
volunteer commandos known as fedayeen. They stepped up raids against
Israel, killing civilians.^ Until the summer of 1955? Egypt denied respon¬
sibility for the fedayeen raids, but on August 26, she acknowledged them
A
officially and acclaimed the fedayeen as national heroes.
Great Britain and France Enter the War
Britain and France entered the war for several reasons. After seizing
power in 1953? Nasser commenced a drive against Britain. In 1953? Britain
gave up the Sudan. In June, 1956, Britain pulled her last soldier out of
the huge Suez base. Meanwhile, Nasser built up Egypt's military strength.
When the West refused to sell Egypt arms, Nasser negotiated a treaty with
Moscow, receiving two hundred MIG planes, fifteen jet fighters, sixty heavy
bombers, one hundred heavy tanks, and two hundred Soviet medium tanks.^
3
Henriques, op. cit., p. 23.
4
Henriques, op. cit., p. 23.
^United States News and World Report, November 9? 1956, p. 33-
^Henriques, op. cit., p. 2k.
'"Why Britain and France Went to War," United States News and World
Report, November 9? 1956, p. 3^»
20
Six weeks after the last British soldiers left Egypt, Nasser, enraged
over the West's refusal to grant the loan for the construction of the Aswan
Dam, nationalized the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal was previously operated by
a private international company with French and British control. Further
antagonizing France, Nasser gave aid and guidance to Arab rebels in Algeria,
O
increasing trouble in that French colony.
On October 29, 1956, Israel Army units crossed into Egyptian territory
at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. On October 30, the following
day, Egypt and Israel were given a British-French ultimatum to cease fighting.
Egypt rejected the ultimatum. She stated that she was not the aggressor
9
and therefore could not be asked to withdraw her troops or stop fighting.
Nasser warned Britain and France that Egypt would fight if they tried
to seize the Suez Canal. He declared that "Egypt will defend her dignity.
After a twelve hour ultimatum, the British and French navies closed in on
c 11Suez.
Anglo-French military operations were highly coordinated. Their
preparations for action against Egypt began when Nasser nationalized the
O
°United States News and World Report, November 9, 1956, p.
9
M. Perlmann, "Between the Devil and the Deep Red Sea," Middle East
Affairs, VII (December, 1956), 430.
10
"Nasser Warns Allies," New York Times, October 31> 1956, p. 1.
i:lm. Perlmann, op. cit., p. 430
21
12
Canal. For months, the French secretly urged Israel to attack Nasser's
Egypt. In April and May of 1956, the French sent twenty-four jet fighters
to Israel with the United States' approval. And since Nasser nationalized
the Canal, France sent additional jet fighters and other military aid to
13
Israel. Ousting Nasser's Government was the real aim of military action.
British and French intelligence agents in Egypt had long been in contact
ill
with anti-Nasser groups in Egypt.
Israel's Foreign Minister defended Israel's position by declaring:
Colonel Nasser has persistently declared that despite
the explicit provisions of the Israeli armistice
agreement, his country remains in a state of war with
Israel. He has carried on a war of limited liability.
It was not Israel that sent murder gangs into Egypt.
It was not Israel that sought to strangle Egypt's
economy and life by illegal blockade of the Suez
Canal and Aqaba. It was Egypt.
It was not Israel that sought to encompass Egypt
with a ring of steel with announced and flaunted
purpose at the appropriate moment of annihilating
her; it was Egypt.
... on top of these things Colonel Nasser has ignored
his international obligations under the charter of
the United Nations, and flaunted his duty under the
Convention of 1888 and the Security Council's reso¬
lution of September 1, 1951 to permit free passage
-^"Battle Report: Plan For A Quick Mop up in Mideast," United States




United States News and World Report, November 9> 1956, p. 33*
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through the Suez Canal for the vessels of all nations
at all times. ...Israel has done everything within
its power to achieve peace with Egypt. Its leaders
have declared their readiness at any time and at any
place to meet with Egyptian representatives and to
discuss a settlement of the mutual problems of the
two countries.
The preoffered hand of peace has always been brutally
and even derisively rejected. Egypt's response has
been to heighten the propaganda of hate and the
hostile activities directed against the very existence
of Israel.^5
Britain, France, and Israel, attacking Egypt, aimed for a swift
elimination of that country's military power. The immediate military
objectives were three. First, to encircle and destroy Egyptian military
forces stationed in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Gaza Strip bordering
Israel. This was assigned to Israel. Second, to destroy the Egyptian
air fields on which two hundred Russian-built MIG planes were based, and
to destroy the supply depots in which Russian-made tanks and Russian
supplied artillery were located. Egypt mortgaged her cotton crop for years
to pay for these weapons that quickly went up in smoke. Third, to reoccupy
as quickly as possible the former British military bases on the Suez Canal.
These bases, restored to British control, would be the key to security of
the Suez zone and give British and French forces time and freedom to deal
with other problems. It was to gain these ends that the attacks were made.
The hope was that peace could be established by military means.^
^"Text of Israeli Statement," New York Times, October 30, 1956, p. 4.
United States News and World Report, November 9> 1956, p. 34.
23
The Role of the United Rations
in Suppressing the War
The White House announced that the United States would take the
issue to the United Rations Security Council under the Tripartite Declara-
17
tion of 1950 and this country's pledge to aid the Middle East.
The ten resolutions adopted by the Security Council were supported
by the United States, the Soviet Union and the Asian and African bloc. The
resolutions are enumerated below in the order of adoption. On Rovember 2,
1956, the United States presented the first resolution. This resolution
called for the withdrawal of Israel behind the "armistice lines," but made
no such request of Britain and France.
On Rovember 4, 1956, Canada offered a resolution. This resolution
requested the Secretary General to submit a plan within forty-eight hours
for an emergency force to secure and supervise a cease-fire in accordance
with all the terms of the Rovember 2 resolution. On Rovember 4, nineteen
Asian and African countries presented a resolution. The resolution again
called for a cease-fire and Israel's withdrawal. On Rovember 5, 1956,
Canada, Columbia and Norway presented a resolution. This resolution gave
specific approval to certain parts of Mr. Hammarskjold's plan for a force
and indicated that it accepted the rest. This resolution named Major
General E. L. M. Burns Chief of the United Rations Command but entrusted
administrative measures to Mr. Hammarskjold. It repeated that the force
would "secure and supervise a cease-fire in accordance with all the terms
'Alfred M. Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East (Hew York, 1957), p.
190.
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of the November 2 resolution." On November 7> Latin America, Western
Europe, Asian and African countries presented a resolution. This resolution
placed Mr. Hammarskjold in direct charge of the United Nations force;
created an Advisory Committee and approved certain parts of his second and
definite plan for the force.-*-9
On November 8, nineteen Asian and African countries reaffirmed the
resolutions of November 2, 4, and y, and called once again upon Britain
and France as well as Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory. It was
the first time, however, that the assembly had requested Britain and France
to withdraw. On November 10, 1956, the United States1 resolution transferred
the Suez issue or, as the United Nations terms it "question considered in
the Security Comicil at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October,
pp
1956," from the emergency session of the assembly to the regular session,
opening two days later.
On November 24, twenty Asian and African countries offered a resolution.
This one called for the withdrawal of Britain, France, and Israel. On
November 24, six countries including the United States approved Mr. Hammar¬
skjold 's plan. They noted with approval the progress he had reported in
arranging to clear the Canal and authorized him to negotiate agreements
for the salvage operations. The Secretary General proposed that nations
comprising the United Nations force meet their own costs for equipment and
p-|
salaries appropriate an initial 10,000,000 dollars to meet other expenses.
1 fl
"United Nations Review Gives Details on Egypt," New York Times,







The United Nations sends troops to Egypt.—On December lo, the United
Nations force moved in and by December 27, Britain, France and Israel were
2i
out. A month later Israel had withdrawn from all but the Gaza Strip,
though it was March U, 1957, when finally under threat of world sanction
the Israeli forces vacated this violently contested strip of territory and
22
the United Nations forces moved in to safeguard the frontier.
Foundations of Peace
"The principle of organized cooperation between the Egyptian authorities
and the users are accepted by Egypt and all other countries. However, both
parties agree that agreements must meet the first three of the six princi¬
ples approved on October 13, 1956, by the Security Council. Interpretation
of these three principles by Egypt on the one hand and by the users on the
other hand differs widely at this stage...before cooperation begins. The
first principle calls for free and open transit.While Egypt has accepted
the six principles in their entirety, it has consistently maintained that
this first principle does not conflict with barring Israeli and Israeli-bound
shipping. The Security Council has ruled that the right of travel cannot be
taken away from any country by Egypt.^
The second principle, calling for respect for Egypt's sovereignty, has
been interpreted by Egypt as giving her the right to veto components of the
United Nations force and to bar Anglo-French crews from participation in the
^Clyde Eagleton, "The United Nations and the Suez Crisis," cited in
Phillip W. Thayer, Taision in the Middle East (Baltimore, 1957), p. 278.
22
Carol A. Fisher and Fred Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis (New York,
1959), p. 60.
21-'"The Suez Canal, Nationalization, Invasion, International Action,"
International Review Service, III (February, 1957), 20.
2^Ibid.
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second and third stages of canal clearance. Both of these actions have been
challenged by countries on the basis that Egypt’s transfer of the functions of
policing and clearance to the United Nations necessarily included a relin-
25
quishment of its sovereignty in these aspects.
The Role of the United States
Since the adoption of the Truman Doctrine, the United States has been
drawn deeper into the affairs of the Middle East. The United States, along
with Britain, has had a common interest in peace, security, oil, and a
permanent solution of the Arab-Israei question, but their interests may not
always coincide on individual problems. In regard to the freedom of naviga¬
tion In the Suez Canal the interests of the United States are small in
26
comparison to those of Britain
When the recent Suez Canal crisis started, the United States was in¬
volved in a presidential campaign. Politicians in the United States injected
the issue into domestic politics. The Department of State realized the
distinction between seizure of the Canal compary and of the Canal itself.
One administrator stated that "Egypt has the rigjit, if it wishes, to nationalize
the Suez Canal Company, assuming that adequate payments are made. If
Nasser does not go further and does not disrupt the operation of the canal,
then everything will be all right.
2d
International Review Service, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
^Alfred M. Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East (New York, 1957),
p. 182.
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!Rie reaction of Britain and France became violent. They stated that
"the Suez Canal would never be ruled by any single power." ° Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles flew to London to meet with Foreign Minister
Selwyn Lloyd and Foreign Minister Pineau of France. Several conferences
were held to arbitrate the differences between the Anglo-French demands
for international control of the Suez Canal. These conferences failed.
After the attack was launched, President Eisenhower announced that the
United States would carry the dispute to the United Nations Security Council.
The President emphasized that the United States would adhere to its pledge
29
to assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East.
Middle East Nationalism, Western Imperialism,
and Soviet Communism
Nationalism is associated with anti-colonialism in the Middle East. It
varies from the moderate brand represented by Prime Minister Bourquiba of
Tunisia to the extreme of the National Liberation Front. Nationalism cannot
be defeated by force.^0
Basic political differences exist among the Middle Eastern states.
These differences add to the instability of this area. Since the war of
191*8, there has been continuing bloodshed over the Arab-Israeli controversy.
The Arabs contend that Israel has taken land that had been Arab for some
^Idlienthal, op. cat., p. 187.
29
LUienthal, op. cit., p. 190.
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Vice Admiral R. E. Libby, "Strategic Military Importance of the Middle
East," cited in Thayer, op. cit., p. 37.
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1*300 years prior to I9I4.8. The Israelis contend that "their light to
32
Palestine was divinely vested in the Hebrew race." The situation is so
involved with anotions and prejudices that the possibility of a settlement
is remote.-3
The Arab League, in its developmental state, became Pan-Arab instead
of Pan-Islamicj association with other non-independent Arab countries was
limited. The Arab League was initiated by Egypt. The leadership fell to
Egypt. A campaign designed against Western imperialism and foreign domina-
tion commenced immediately after the League was formed.
Egypt proposed a joint defense and economic treaty in 1950 to strengthen
the League. The treaty was ratified in 1952. It stipulated military
assistance to the whole League.''’
The United Arab Republic was formed in 1958. Opposing factions resulted
due to rivalries and suspicions among Arab leaders. The prime objective of




^Fisher and Krinsky, op. cit., p. 21.
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The concept of imperialism is restricted and precise to some Islamic
people. The imperialist is always Western. The Arab who rebels against
imperialism is not aware of the fact that his ancestors who conquered an
empire from the Pyrenees to the Oxus were imperialists.
The Arab conceives the imperialist to be a man who comes across the
sea in a ship, lands on the coast, buys and sells, works his way inland
and by devious methods establishes his rule. To some extent this is a
distortion of Western imperialism.^
In the late 1950's, there was a changing configuration of the great
powers in the Middle East. There was a decline in European influence and
an increase in that of the Soviet Union. This anti-Western, pro-Soviet
feeling was enhanced by the technological success of the Soviet Union.
40
Thus there was an alliance between Communism and nationalism.
In conclusion, it has to be recognized that the disappearance of
Western imperialism offers in itself no guarantee against the extension of
Soviet influence.^
This nationalistic feeling would seem to suggest that the West should
cease intervening in the affairs of the Middle East, but the Western world
will continue to pursue its interest in the face of this adversity.^2
38-
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4lIbid.
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Decline of Soviet Influences, 1961
There seems to have been a decline of Soviet penetration of the Middle
East in more recent times. Egypt, along with other Arab states, is becoming
43
neutral. "The cooling off process began with attacks by Moscow on Arab
44
leaders...due to their treatment of home-grown Communists."
The schism had been long in the making. For some time Nasser had been
jailing home-grown Communists even while toasting Soviet dignitaries
and signing new trade pacts with the Communist bloc. He has effectively
45
purged them from the government, the press, and the schools.
"The Arab world rallied behind Nasser in his defiance of Communist
attacks. ...four members of the Arab League, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen
and Jordan denounced Russia for interferring in the domestic affairs of
46
Arab countries." Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Ibrahim Sawail stated
that "we will not abide Soviet attacks on any Arab Country and least of
47
all the United Arab Republic our biggest sister."
Haj Taha A1 Fayez stated in his daily Al-Fajr Al-Jadid that: "The
sun of the Communist has set. The countries are falling to bits through
43
44







"The Middle East," Time, June 23, 1961, p. 20.
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starvation and ruination." According to the daily A1 Akhbar, Arab public
opinion is not ready to take lesson from the "organizers of blood baths in
Mosul and Kirkuk." y Columnist El Tabee declared that "we shall not
tolerate any country becoming the gate through which Communism can penetrate
into the heart of the Arab world.Nasser's United Arab Republic has
secured 1.25 billion dollars worth of aid from the Soviet Union and still
demands more.-^ Khrushchev could pressure Nasser by refusing aid, but this
52
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this investigation the term Middle East will he used with the under¬
standing that it embraces
the Arab League states (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen), Cyprus, Iran, Israel, the
principalities along the southern and eastern fringes
of the Arabian Peninsula, (the crown colony and pro¬
tectorate of Aden, Muscat and Oman, Trucial Oman, Qata,
the Bahrayn Archipelaga and Kuwait), the Sudan and
Turkey. 1
The importance of the Middle East is threefold: economic, strategic
and political.
"The Middle East is the world's richest treasure house of petroleum.
Under the barren sands and rocks of this arid land. ..have been found some
seventy per cent of the proved oil reserves of the world. The increase in
production has been so rapid that the Middle East now supplies twenty-five
2
per cent of the world's needs."
The only major powers that exploit substantial deposits are the
Soviet Union and the United States. Petroleum is produced for the rest of
the world in non-consuming areas and shipped by ocean tankers or pipelines
to consuming areas. The Middle East has tremendous natural advantages in
a situation like this. It has a highly competitive position in the markets
of Asia, Africa, Europe and South America due to its geographical position
C. Hurewitz, "Unity and Disunity in the Middle East," International
Concilation, CCCCLXXXI (May, 1952), 201.
p
Huey Louis Kostanick, "Oil in World Politics," Current History, XXXIII
(November 7, 1957), 265.
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and easy access to both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. It is even
competitive under certain price situations in the United States.3
The Middle East has sometimes been referred to as "the concourse of
the Continents."
Standing at the juncture of Asia, Africa and Europe,
the area links the Continents by narrow land routes
and by narrow waterways. The Turkish Straits, Suez,
the Red Sea, The Babal-Mameb, the Straits of Ormuz
and the Persian Gulf have through the ages served
man in his communications, travels and trade. Al¬
though air travel may seem to have lessened the
importance of these old arteries of the world, the
commotion aroused in foreign offices of world
powers by the stoppage of the Suez Canal in 1956
amply illustrated that Middle Eastern waterways ,
had not lost their aged-old usefulness and value.
The relationship of the Middle East to air routes between Europe, Asia,
and South America has not been overlooked since the end of World War I.
Important international airports had developed at Istambul, Beirut, Cairo,
Khartoum, and D'hahran by the middle of the century. Almost every inter¬
national air line has scheduled flights to or through the Middle East.
Transportation and communication routes by land, water and air have placed
the Middle East in a commanding position in the twentieth century.3
Today the Middle East has a strategic importance so great that the
battle for its future may well determine the outcome of the world struggle.
The fate of Europe depends on the West retaining a major foothold in the
3Ibid.





America, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union are the great industrial-
economic powers in the world. The Soviet Union and America represent the
most powerful of the three. If one would examine closely the opposing
powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, one could see that they
are of nearly equal strength.
Libby states that "Western Europe, with its population of 200 million
and its complex industrial plant, is the factor that retains the balance of
7
power for the West."1
By separating the United States from Western Europe, the power posi¬
tion of the Soviet Union would be strengthened. The West is aware of the
fact that the Soviet Union may accomplish this by using the Middle East as
Q
the lever to pursue this objective.
It is vital that the Middle East remain part of the free world. Its
o
loss to Communism would alter the world balance of power drastically.
Therefore, by holding the balance of power, the Middle East is of political
importance to the West. It has had a stormy history. The crisis which
occurred in 1956 has been recorded in history as one of the most serious
conflicts encountered by the Middle East.
°"0ur Stake in the Middle East," Current History, November 7, 1957?
p. 272.
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The crisis of 1956 was centered around the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal
was constructed hy deLesseps. The Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime
de Suez operated the Suez Canal until 1956. It was operated under a charter
issued by Said Pasha of Egypt in 1869. The exact character of the company
was ill-defined. Operating as an international organization, the Company
was and still remains French in ownership and administration. Administrative
headquarters was established and maintained in Alexandria but its corporate
offices were set up in Paris.^ "The British Government... owned 43 3/4 per
cent of the shares. As the recipient of the largest dividend check, Great
Britain takes a jealous interest in the continued good health of the
corporation and at the drop of a fez will fight for its somewhat dusty pri¬
vileges in Egypt.
Egypt derived almost no benefits of any kind from the operations of
the Suez Canal Company during most of the period since the opening of the
Canal in l869.12
The operation of the Canal was prepared by the Constantinople Conven¬
tion of 1888. The ingredients of this convention provided that:
The Canal should always be open to non-discriminatory
passage in time of war as well as peace; no act of
hostility having for its purpose interference with
10Halford L Huskins, "The Suez Canal," Current History, XXXIII
(November 7; 1957); 258.
^Earnest 0. Houser, "Richest Ditch on Earth," Saturday Evening Post,
February 19, 1949; P* 26.
12
'Huskins, op. cit., t>. 259
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the free navigation of the canal should be committed
in the canal or its parts of access.^
In 1950? the West agreed under the Tripartite Pact to maintain peace
in the Middle East. The West agreed to render military aid to Arabs or Jews
if either should be attacked by the other.^ It was because of this agree¬
ment that the United States carried the 1956 dispute to the United Nations.
In 195*+> Nasser ascended to power. Egypt was declared a Republic on
June 18, 1953* Nagib, Nasser's predecessor, was made President of the
Republic as well as Prime Minister. Nasser was Deputy Prime Minister of
Defense. Nagib accused Nasser of militarizing the government. By late
1953, there were rumors of quarrels between Nagib and Nasser.^
The conflict can be summed up in this way:
Nagib was fifty-one at the time of the coup. Nasser
was only thirty-five. Nagib insisted that Nasser
allow him to run the government, in fact as well as
in name until the younger man acquired the necessary
experience to take over. Nagib believed in going
slowly and in winning as broad popular support as
possible. Nasser wanted to use quick surgery rather
than slow medicine to cure Egypt's ills. Some of
the younger officers pressed Nasser to get rid of
Nagib. Secret meetings were held in Nagib's absence.
Nagib learned of this and in February 195*+ submitted
his resignation. °
TO
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After seizing power in 195^> Nasser and Britain signed an agreement
calling for the complete evacuation of British troops. All troops were to
leave the canal zone within twenty months after the conclusion of the agree¬
ment. Thereafter, the British could maintain military installations in the
zone, operated by civilian technicians for five years. During that period,
if there should be an external attack on any Arab state or Turkey, Britain
would be allowed to re-occupy the zone.^
Nasser was strongly criticized for signing the Suez agreement. Com¬
munists, Moslems, and Arab Nationalists everywhere took a dim view of the
1 ft
clauses allowing the return of British troops in case of war.
"As to the evacuation, it was the Egyptian spokesman who had given
the most ground. Twenty months was a long time, not for soldiers...but
for public opinion which would want to know the reasons for such a delay.
As for the technicians appointed to maintain the base Nasser came out on
top; first because it had been stipulated that they should be civilian con¬
tractors; second because the company had the right to hire no more than
1,200 British experts. On the third and last point, Nasser had had to
capitulate since Egypt admitted herself to be committed to grant the United
Kingdom every facility needed for placing the base on a warlike footing
and operating it effectively, and to do so in the event of an armed attack
17
Wynn, op. cit., p. 91.
^Wynn, op. cit., p. 91-
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Jean E. Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, Trans. Francis
Scarfe (New York, 1958), p. 207.
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by a power outside the Middle East against any country which at the date of
the present agreement is a signatory of the treaty of mutual defense between
the Arab states, signed in Cairo in 1950 or against Turkey. Nasser had
therefore given in on the Turkish clause, accepting that the Egyptians should
consider that any attack on Turkey involved themselves. This was indirectly
linking Egyptian defense with the Atlantic coalition. In exchange the
Egyptian negotiations had the assurance that Britain would not take advantage
of an Israeli-Arab dispute in order to return to the base, by stipulating
that the attack invoking the application of the treaty from a power outside
20
the zone of the Middle East.
Iraq threatened Nasser's aim to lead the Arab world. Iraq joined the
Bagdad Pact in 1.954, along with Great Britain, Pakistan, Turkey, and later
Iran. The major objective of the Bagdad Pact was to combat Soviet expansion
in the Middle E. st. After the Bagdad Pact was signed Iraq secured arms from
the West. Thus Nasser's leadership was threatened. Nasser tried to purchase
arms from the United States, and at the same time stepped up the intensity and
distructiveness of the fedayeen raids in Israel. x
In 1955 j the United States informed Nasser that he could purchase
twenty-seven million dollars worth of arms but would have to pay cash. A
large cash outlay would have stripped the Egyptian treasury of hard currency.
Nasser threatened to turn to the Soviet Union for arms. The West did not
20
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William F. Longgood, Suez Story, Key to Middle East (New York, 195T)>
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39
take Nasser's statement seriously.22 In 1955; Nasser invited Dmitri Shepilov,
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union to Egypt. Shortly after this visit
Nasser announced that Egypt had purchased arms from Czechslovakia in exchange
for cotton and rice.23 The Arab world's response was hysterical. Nasser
was hailed as the savior of the Arab World. Nasser appealed to the West
for a loan to construct the Aswan Dam in 1955- The West agreed to give
Nasser the loan (Washington 5*+ million dollars and Britain 16 million
. 24
dollars). Nasser was slow about accepting the loan, boasting that he was
considering a much better offer from the Soviet Union. Finally, he stated
that he was ready to do business. A few days later, the United States
stated that it was not feasible to participate in this project. Britain
echoed the United States' lead. A few days later the Soviet Union announced
that it could not participate in the project.^
On July 27, 1956, Nasser nationalized the canal. Speaking to the
Egyptian people, Nasser declared that:
...the West's offer of financial assistance was
accompanied by impossible conditions involving
Egyptian sovereignty...the reasons why America
and Britain denied the loan...was because we
have decided to equip our army and follow an
independent policy.
22
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He accused Washington of:
Acting without shame and with disregard for the
principles of international relations...Egyptians
will not permit any imperialists or oppressors
to rule us militarily, political, or economically;
we will not submit to the dollar or force....^7
On July 26, 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez
Canal. The stockholders would be repaid at the prevailing price on the stock
market. He emphasized the fact that the Egyptians constructed the Suez Canal
and 120,000 Egyptians died constructing it. "The High Dam shall be built,
he declared on the skulls of the 120,000 Egyptian workmen who died building
the Suez Canal.
. .. the Egyptian government was bound by two types
of text. There were the firman’s or Ottoman
decrees of 1854 and 1856 which conceded the ex¬
ploitation of the canal to a World Suez Canal
Company for 99 years dating from the opening of
the waterways, that is to say from 1869 to 1968.
Then there was the International Convention of
Constantinople of 1888, which laid down the most
solemn undertaking of the utmost international
importance that the passage of all ships of
whatever nationality should be maintained with¬
out discrimination even in times of war. This
undertaking had been violated already by Great
Britain, Egypt's protector, with regard to
German ships.^9
Worse still, Egypt's refusal to allow access to the canal of ships
carrying cargoes to Israel was also a violation.3®
^Cited in Longgood, op. cit ■, p. 146.
28°Cited in Longgood, op. cit., p. l46.
^Lacouture, op. cit., p. 475•
■^"The Suez Canal," The New Statesman and Nation, August 4, 1956, p. 124.
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Egypt was condemned twice by the Security Council, but she refused to
change her policy. She invoked article 10 of the Constantinople to the
effect that Egypt alone is the only sovereign power entitled to restrict
the passage of ships, should it prove necessary to her defense.31
Several conferences were held in London. The purpose of the conferences
was to negotiate the differences between the Anglo-French demands for inter¬
ns
national control of the Suez Canal.
Britain and France encouraged the use of force. The United States was
involved in a presidential election and could not afford a war at this
time. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, encouraged Britain and France
to call a conference of the signatories of the 1888 Convention and other
maritime powers.33
The first conference failed. For Britain and France the failure of
this conference cleared the way for a solution by force.3^
To calm Britain and France, Secretary Dulles tried another idea at
the second conference. The User's Association was set up. The eighteen
powers could not agree on how the canal should be operated. Finally the
matter was submitted to the Security Council where agreement was reached on
six basic principles. For the first time during the crisis genuine nego¬
tiations took place between the Foreign Secretaries of all three countries.35
31Lacouture, op. cit., p. 4-75 •
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"They affirmed Egyptian sovereignty, and the need for free and
open transit through the Canal. They stated that the operation of the
canal should be insulated from the politics of any country. More important
the manner of fixing the tolls was to be decided by agreement between
Egypt and the users, and a fair proportion allotted to development; if
there were disagreements on this, or about the compensation due to the
Company, settlement should be made by arbitration. The full resolution
had a second part, laying down the procedure for applying these principles.
This was vetoed by Russia, but the six principles were accepted.
It seemed as if a genuine settlement has been made. Egypt's admission
of the principle of arbitration was a real consession. This was about as
much as the West could obtain since Nasser would accept no agreement which
had sanctions written into it in case he violated it. Nasser suggested a
meeting at Geneva to work out final details. It appeared that John Foster
Dulles' policy of patient and persistent arbitration had succeeded. This
might have been the case had not the Israelis decided that the time had
come to launch an attack on Egypt. ' The Israeli leaders claimed the balance
of power in the Middle East was shifting from Israel to Arabs because of
Soviet arms pouring into Egypt and Syria. They concurred that Nasser intended
now to force or demand surrender. Israel's Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and
his military leaders were convinced that this was a good time for a showdown
■^Mowat, op. cit., p. 225.
^United States News and World Report, November 9> 195&, P- 29.
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with Nasser for these reasons. The United States was involved in a presi¬
dential election. The Soviet Union's satellite had collapsed. Egypt was
isolated. Nasser could not turn to the United States nor the Soviet Union
for help. Nasser had alienated leaders of other Arab countries by his
empire-building. Jordan's army had been torn asunder by rivalries. Iraq
desired Arab leadership, and therefore, was not anxious to save Nasser.
Syria was under a weak regime and Saudia Arabia was suspicious of Nasser,
who was known to be encouraging some Saudi officers to seize power, in order
to turn that country into an Egyptian satellite. These circumstances gave
Israel a feeling of security.3®
On October 29, 195o, the Israeli Army marched into the Sinai Peninsula
and into the Gaza Strip to eliminate the fedayeen nests and to destroy the
39
bases for the planned Egyptian attack against Israel.
Prior to the invasion several incidents occurred. Egypt and other
Arab nations refused to sign peace with Israel after the war in Palestine
in 19^9-After the war in 1948, the Arab states agreed to carry on war
by other means. The Arab "boycott" became a feature of the international
scene. It penetrated the political, social, diplomatic, cultural and
economic activity of Israel. The Arabs refused to meet and talk with Israel.
They did not like the idea of other countries and other people associating
3®Arthur C. P. Liveran, "Israel and the Middle East," Current History,
XXXIII (November 7, 1957). 290.
•^United States News and World Report, November 9; 1956, p. 33-
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with her either. Nasser encouraged the fedayeen raids in Israel. At
the same time he alienated the West by purchasing arms from the Soviet Union.
He antagonized France by rendering aid to the Arab rebels in Algeria. The
West failed to get Nasser to agree on some form of international control
4?
over the Suez Canal.
Egypt rejected the ultimatum issued by Britain and France to cease
fighting. Britain and France announced that they would occupy the canal
43
zone.
One day before Israel invaded Egypt and two days before Britain and
France intervened, the White House received a report from the Central
Intelligence Agency. This report stated that Israel would attack Egypt
and Britain and France would attack the Suez Canal area. The report did
not designate the exact dates nor did it state the ultimatum issued by
44
Britain and France to Egypt and Israel.
After the attack was launched the White House announced that the United
States would take the issue to the United Nations' Security Council under the
Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and this country's pledge to aid victims of
4s
aggression in the Middle East.
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The Israeli action has unfolded to the world of public opinion the
fears of the Soviet arms build-up in Egypt and the dangers of Nasser as the
would-be conqueror of the Middle East. Israel has gained sympathy and
understanding throughout the free world.
The failure of the United Nations to act decisively on this principle
has not affected Israel. Through the United Nations, Israel secured a
shorter route for imports and exports to and from Africa. Arab solidarity
was not a military factor because the other Arab states refused to intervene
h-l
on the side of Egypt. 1
Liveran infers that the West has many things to apologize for. The
Arabic speaking world has fallen behind the best levels of political and
technological progress. The French Revolution might never have occurred
as far as the Arab world was concerned. The doctrines of political equality
and social justice which enlightened Europe made no impression upon Arabia,
which continued to organize itself upon the medieval feudal patterns. The
Industrial Revolution might never have occurred as far as the Middle East
is concerned. The success in technology which had revolutionized material
progress made no impression on the miserable condition of millions who
inhabited the central Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.48
Nasserism, a term used interchangeably with nationalism
is the expression of the aspiration of forty-million
Arabs in the Middle East...Nasserism...can be defined
46
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in general terms as the Arabs' yearning for independence
and dignity. At this stage the emphasis is on dignity.
Independence can be granted them by greater powers
and has been granted to most Arabs. But dignity is
something which must be attained.^9
The three goals of independence, unity and self-better¬
ment which formed the substance of nationalism in the
Arab mind from 1945 to 1955 remain today the cardinal
elements in the credo of Arab nationalism. But a signi¬
ficant change has occurred affecting the meaning of
each of these goals. While in the progress of pursuing
their national objectives, the Arab nationalities had
little occasion to entertain divergent opinions on what
these objectives signified or how they would be exer¬
cised once they were attained. But soon after their
attainment, partial though it was, it became apparent
that the ways in which they could be exercised were
many and diverse.50
...the search for dignity often produces undignified
postures. Many things are done in the name of dignity
that appear only ridiculous and irritating to outsiders.51-
In the early 1950's the Middle East showed signs of leaning toward the
Soviet Union. The anti-Western, pro-Soviet feeling was enhanced by the
technological success of the Soviet Union. Many people were convinced that
there was an alliance between Soviet Communism and Middle East nationalism.
The trend changed somewhat by 1961. Khrusehev, who previously boasted of
how two different social systems could get along with each other, turned
against Nasser.5^
In trying to dissolve his Soviet relationship, Nasser ousted the
Communists from the government, the press and the schools. Many were sent
4q
Wynn, op. cit., p. 205-
^°Fayez A. Snyegh, "Arab Nationalism Today," Current History, XXXIII
(November 7, 1957), 284.
^"Hjynn, op. cit., p. 205.
52Time, June l6, 1961, p. 22.
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sent to prison. This alienated the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could
have refused economic assistance, but this would have turned Nasser even
further toward the West. It appeared that Nasser played the East against
the West.^3
As a result of this recent occurrence, one can conclude that the
Arab world desires to be independent of both major world blocs. On February
1, 1958, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and President Khurkri A1
Kuwatly of Syria announced that the two countries would unite. Syrians
and Egyptians were highly pleased over this event. Many Syrians felt that
Egypt would relieve them of some uncertainties experienced the year before
when tension existed along the Turkish frontier and the army seized and
controlled by a left-wing element. Syria had very little to offer Egypt.
Her cotton was a poor competitor against Egypt's variety. The businessmen
of the two countries adhered to different philosophies concerning the
economy. The Syrian businessmen adhered to free spending and uncontrolled
trading. The Egyptian businessmen adhered to strict controls and restricted
spending. The Syrians were very ambitious, and their intellectuals felt
that they should create ideas for Nasser's Pan-Arab movement. Tension rose
a month after the union. The commander of the Syrian Army was dismissed
and gradually the Syrian army was integrated with Egypt's. Thus the first
army of the United Arab Republic was initiated. The two governments clashed
when Nasser drove the left-wing element underground in the spring of 1961.
The Syrian right-wing became annoyed with Nasser's land reforms. In the
•^Time, June l6, 1961, p. 23.
spring of 1961, Nasser denounced, the Syrian free economy. This agitated the
businessmen, and soon they began to smuggle their goods out of the country.^
The Syrian regional Cabinet was abolished August 17, 1961, and a national
Cabinet for both was established. On September 28, 1961, Syria rebelled
against the ties of Egypt. Nasser refused to oppose the rebellion with
force.55 on September 29, 1961, Syria won independence.
The situation that existed in Egypt as of November, 1961, can be
summed up like this:
Food prices had risen far above the purchasing power
of the poor man. A 100 million dollar trade deficit
existed in Egypt. Although Egypt sells a majority
of her exports to Communist countries she cannot
secure the imports she desires in those communist
countries. Reserves of foreign currencies are down.
City dwellers are suffering as a result of Nasser's
drive to socialize Egypt. The illiterate peasants
are securing only a small amount of the land Nasser
promised them. The Aswan Dam project is fair behind
restless and
As of March 18, 1962, Nasser is still in control in Egypt. It seems
that Washington and Moscow are aware that he is the man to negotiate with
in the Middle East. He has obtained arms from the Soviet Union and financial
assistance from the United States. At the present time, Egypt is under
strict discipline. Many liberties are being sacrificed for economic control.
in schedule. Hence the Egyptians are
angry with Nasser. '
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An isolationist policy is being directed toward Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Nasser no longer entertains the philosophy of Arab unity but advocates Arab
socialism. He still depends on both the East and West for military and
financial aid. Israel has threatened Egypt with a plan to secure water
from the Jordan River to the Niger Desert. If Israel pursues this plan
peace will be shattered. There is talk of an alliance between Iraq and
Syria. Iraq has desired Arab leadership for some time. Syria and Iraq
have something in common, a distrust for Mr. Nasser.5®
One can conclude that tension still exists in the Middle East. If
any one of the events described above is carried out there might be war in
the Middle East. It is safe to say that the Middle East is still an unstable
and potentially explosive area.
As Norman Shavin observes:
Recipe for turmoil: oil, sand, political conflict,
wealth, land, power. Stir well and the result has
been, for centuries, a volatile mixture that spells
Middle East. The area is oil-rich, strategically
important, commercially potent and religiously
significant.59
58J George McArthur, "Middle East Sees Nasser on the Rise," Atlanta
Journal and Constitution, March 18, 1962, p. 3B.
•^Norman Shavin, "Middle East Ever Volatile," Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, June 2k, 1962, p. IB.
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